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FOREWORD
Initial operations in Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in
2003, seemed to validate claims for the decisive impact
of American airpower in modern war. However, the
messy insurgencies that followed demonstrated that
even primitive foes with adept communication skills
could use information campaigns to limit the effectiveness of superior technology and create significant
problems in diplomacy and public relations. In some
ways, we are our own worst enemy in that regard,
having created some unrealistic expectations for the
capabilities of technology that our enemies can exploit.
Airpower remains America’s greatest asymmetric
advantage on the battlefield, and in this Letort Paper,
Dr. Conrad Crane suggests some ways strategic communications can be improved to enhance its effectiveness. He traces the course of the U.S. Air Force’s
pursuit of true precision capabilities, and how expectations always seem to get ahead of reality. The greatest challenge for current military leaders may not be
in educating their civilian bosses about all the things
the military instrument of power can accomplish, but
instead explaining what it cannot.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this Letort Paper as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple with the use of airpower around the
world. With the continuing American reluctance to get
involved in any extended ground deployments, airpower will probably remain the initial tool of choice for
political leaders wanting to employ coercive military
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force. This Letort Paper provides some important
insights on how to do that better and smarter.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Of all the American military services, the two most
active and adept in strategic communications in the
last century have been the U.S. Marine Corps and the
U.S. Air Force (USAF). As the smallest service, the
Marines have pursued a very successful public relations campaign to trumpet their accomplishments and
ensure their survival. It is a standing joke that a Marine
rifle squad consists of eight riflemen and two cameramen. As the newest service, the USAF has had evolving motivations for its communications efforts, but the
main goal has always been to escape being relegated
to simply a supporting role for everyone else. Initially,
USAF leaders wanted to gain independence for their
service and later to prove its equality and even ascendency relative to the others. Arguably, adept strategic
communications is what created the USAF. With the
country’s vast distances and relative isolation from
continental threats, along with faith in technology and
a preference to avoid bloody close combat, Americans
have always been uniquely attracted to airpower, a
fact that has been very successfully exploited by generations of USAF leaders. But, as a result, the nation
has often entered conflicts with exorbitant expectations about what airpower could actually accomplish,
creating unique challenges in strategic communications when promises did not match reality, especially
in recent conflicts. American airpower doctrine built
around a precision-strike capability envisions a rational targeting approach to war that is more relevant
to the conventional battlefield than to wars among
the people. Airpower is an important component of
a unique and asymmetric American way of war that
relies heavily on technology, and adaptive enemies
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have become very adept at using carefully crafted
information campaigns as an effective counter.
Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell was
the first great publicist for American airpower, but it
was World War II Army Air Forces (AAF) Commanding General Henry “Hap” Arnold who used strategic
communications effectively to achieve independence
for his service. He was able to trumpet the impressive
accomplishments of his airmen without alienating the
public or political leaders with unsettling images of
indiscriminate destruction. However, the use of the
words “precision bombing” to describe AAF doctrine
established a set of expectations that could not be met
with the technology of the era. USAF leaders during
the Korean war complained about too many ground
commanders and political leaders expecting “miracles from airpower,” while, at the same time, airmen
remained reluctant to “advertise limitations” to those
leaders or the press. After the Korean Armistice Agreement, the service was quick to claim with determined
publicity that it had achieved decisive results with an
“air pressure” campaign that decimated most cities
and towns in North Korea, an opinion not shared by
historians.
Taking the wrong lessons from that conflict and
the early Cold War, the USAF had the wrong doctrine, equipment, and training to deal with limited
war in Southeast Asia. While USAF leaders chafed
under restrictions that they believed limited their
effectiveness in Vietnam, another resolute enemy with
a simple economy thwarted superior weapons technology. The Operation LINEBACKER II bombing in
December 1972, however, again allowed the service to
claim decisiveness while ignoring its limitations. But
it was Operation DESERT STORM and the perceived
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effectiveness of precision-strike technology that really
launched a deluge of claims that warfare had changed
and airpower was now the dominant military tool.
Air operations in the disintegrating situation in
Yugoslavia seemed to support these new expectations.
Seventeen days of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) air strikes during Operation DELIBERATE
FORCE in 1995 helped persuade the Serbs to accept a
ceasefire in Bosnia, and then 78 more days and nights
of NATO bombing during Operation ALLIED FORCE
produced a settlement over Kosovo. Again, however,
the initial expectations for the effectiveness and precision of air strikes proved severely exaggerated. Claims
of destroyed Serb military equipment turned out to be
extremely inflated, and images of unexpected civilian
casualties caused severe strains in the Allied coalition while increasing Serb fears and weakening their
resolve. Ironically, such incidents appeared to have
reduced the will to continue the conflict on both sides.
Michael Ignatieff has aptly pointed out that the journalists’ accounts of the maneuvering of cruise missiles
in Operation DESERT STORM and fascination with
precision munitions have reinforced a myth in Western publics that war can now be thought of as laser
surgery or a video game. In the dogged pursuit of the
ideal of “precision bombing,” the USAF has increased
its capabilities tremendously, but the term “surgical air
strike” remains an oxymoron. Some targeting errors
and technical failures will always occur, and blast
effects are often unpredictable. Mistakes will always
look more sinister when air forces claim perfection.
This same scenario has played out in Afghanistan and Iraq. The quick fall of the Taliban in 2001
reinforced the predilections of leaders already enamored with airpower and new technology, but soon
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growing insurgencies in both countries forced a relook
at the application of force in such conflicts. Despite the
essential role airpower has played, a weakness of the
application of long-range precision strikes in the contemporary information environment is that who controls the ground controls the message. Enemies have
become very adept at crafting images of destroyed
mosques and dead civilians, creating a narrative of
callous and indiscriminate bombings. Foes have been
much more adept in such strategic communications
than the United States and NATO. Despite this, American political leaders continue to have great hopes for
what airpower can do. Barack Obama has admitted that
his “worst mistake” as President was his (along with
European partners) resort to airpower alone in 2011 to
overthrow Muammar Qaddafi in Libya without a corresponding ground force for control and rebuilding.
There are many ironies in the American experience
with strategic communications and airpower. The pursuit of precision has produced truly impressive capabilities but even more exorbitant expectations. This
is often fueled by service advocates seeking budget
advantages or sincerely believing that the USAF has
been maligned or neglected, and rarely informed by
the objective evaluation of air campaigns. Success in
selling those capabilities to decision-makers and actual
accomplishments utilizing them in operations have
further contributed to unrealistic expectations, with
political leaders especially attempting to do too much
with the wrong military tool. Americans have always
had great faith in technology, a fact that has assisted
in the growth of the USAF while contributing to the
weight of expectations that it bears. The current state
of “counterinsurgency fatigue” in the United States
with no desire to employ ground troops will increase
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burdens on airmen even more. It is not surprising that
many in the international arena seek normative ways
to limit the unique advantages airpower dominance
brings to the United States, creating another potential
obstacle.
Building on the legacy of Billy Mitchell and Hap
Arnold to create and publicize a unique set of warmaking capabilities, the USAF has become an
unmatched air service that inspires unrealistic expectations for what American airpower can do. The hardest
strategic communications task for future U.S. military
leaders will not be to explain all the great things their
aircraft can accomplish, but instead, to honestly admit
what they cannot.
The report closes with five recommendations about
strategic communications and airpower:
• Manage expectations and keep all options open.
• Educate leaders and the public.
• Be first with the truth.
• Fight the information war relentlessly.
• Invest more in foreign internal defense.
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CREATING GREAT EXPECTATIONS:
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND
AMERICAN AIRPOWER
Of all the American military services, the two most
active and adept in strategic communications in the last
century have been the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S.
Air Force (USAF). As the smallest service, the Marines
have pursued a very successful public relations campaign to trumpet their accomplishments and ensure
their survival. It is a standing joke that a Marine rifle
squad consists of eight riflemen and two cameramen.
As the newest service, the USAF has had evolving
motivations for its communications efforts, but the
main goal has always been to escape being relegated
to simply a supporting role for everyone else. Initially,
USAF leaders wanted to gain independence for their
service and later to prove its equality and even ascendency relative to the others. Arguably, adept strategic
communications is what created the USAF. With the
country’s vast distances and relative isolation from
continental threats, along with faith in technology and
a preference to avoid bloody close combat, Americans
have always been uniquely attracted to airpower, a fact
that has been very successfully exploited by generations of USAF leaders. However, as a result, the nation
has often entered conflicts with exorbitant expectations about what airpower could actually accomplish,
creating unique challenges in strategic communications when promises did not match reality, especially
in recent conflicts. American airpower doctrine built
around a precision-strike capability envisions a rational targeting approach to war that is more relevant
to the conventional battlefield than to wars among
the people. Airpower is an important component of
a unique and asymmetric American way of war that
1

relies heavily on technology, and adaptive enemies
have become very adept at using carefully crafted
information campaigns as an effective counter.
PIONEERS OF STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATIONS—MITCHELL
AND ARNOLD
Early attitudes about strategic communications on
the U.S. Army Air Corps (predecessor of the U.S. Army
Air Forces [AAF]) were shaped by the experience of
Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell, the most
outspoken American airpower advocate in the period
between the World Wars. He commanded the Air Service of the American Expeditionary Force in France,
which included working with the newly independent
Royal Air Force (RAF), and returned from that war
determined to get the American air arm its due.
When his initial campaign to get recognition within
military and government circles failed, he moved to
a more public campaign, shrewdly emphasizing the
defensive capabilities of airpower for the United States.
His spectacular sinking of the battleship Ostfriesland
in 1921 was the highlight of this phase of his strategic
communications plan. When that failed to achieve his
objectives, his arguments became more shrill; then in
1924 he began to attack the War and Navy Departments
in a series of articles in the press alleging “treasonable
administration of the national defense” because of
their neglect of airpower.
Such actions eventually led to his court-martial
conviction in late 1925 for conduct prejudicial to good
order and discipline and bringing discredit upon the
military service. His unusual punishment, 5 years
suspension from active duty at half pay, achieved its
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purpose in motivating Mitchell to resign from military service. The future leaders of the USAF―Henry
“Hap” Arnold, Carl Spaatz, and Ira Eaker―were
all inspired by him, and he established a legacy that
senior American air service leaders had to be outspoken advocates for airpower. However, those who witnessed his court-martial also realized that they had to
be less confrontational in the way they presented their
arguments.1
Mitchell continued his publicity campaign as a
civilian, expanding his claims for airpower’s potential for independent decisiveness. When he advocated
Giulio Douhet’s views about independent and decisive
airpower devastating enemy cities in 1933, Mitchell
was no longer a major influence on those individuals
developing AAF doctrine. Either because of his earlier
military experience in the ruthless guerrilla war in the
Philippines or from his incessant desire for publicity,
Mitchell tended, as time went on, to become more
extreme in support of terror bombing of cities and
more out of touch with mainstream Air Corps views
about precision attacks against industry. Ironically,
while resigning from the service after his court-martial
gave him more freedom to advocate for airpower publicly, it also lessened his influence and connection with
those actually developing American air doctrine.2
As World War II began, AAF leaders were especially
sensitive to public opinion since the airmen believed
they needed all the support they could get to achieve
independent status. Between the wars, Army Aviators
had promoted “air-mindedness” and exploited American dreams that the airplane could revolutionize daily
life and transform the world for good. At the core of
the precision-bombing doctrine was the belief that the
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American public would not stand for the indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilians.3
Leading the AAF was Commanding General Henry
“Hap” Arnold. In order to support his desire for a postwar independent air service, Arnold wanted to avoid
alienating the public with unsettling images of indiscriminate destruction, but he also needed impressive
results to prove the effectiveness of airpower. His main
objective was to make the largest possible contribution to winning the war while ensuring that the AAF
received proper credit through plentiful publicity.
Accordingly, he demanded much from his field commanders in the area of public relations. He wrote to
them in 1942, “Within the borders of [the] continental
United States, two most important fronts exist, namely,
aircraft production and public opinion.” He thought
that the American public was entitled “to see pictures,
stories, and experiences of our Air Force in combat
zones,” and he sent personnel from his staff around
the world to gather such information. He favored the
declassification of as much information as possible,
which is an unusual position for most military leaders. In 1943, he complained to his commanders that
too much information was being withheld because of
secrecy; it was more important that the people be kept
informed of the major impact the AAF was making on
the enemy’s war effort, an impact that could save millions of lives in ground combat.
For whole-hearted and official support of our Air Forces
in their operations, . . . the people [must] understand
thoroughly our Air Force precepts, principles, and
purposes. . . . In short, we want the people to understand
and have faith in our way of making war [italics in original].”4
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Field commanders protested vehemently when
Arnold tried to get them to replace a machine gun from
the bombers with a camera to provide more combat
film footage, but their objections had little effect on his
drive for media coverage. Arnold exerted even more
pressure for publicity once the Allies invaded Europe
and the war seemed to be approaching its conclusion.
He complained that ground and naval commanders
such as General George Patton and Admiral William
Halsey were overly publicized, while the contribution of airpower was ignored. He emphasized to his
subordinates that he considered “the whole subject
of realistic reorientation of the public’s concept of the
effect of air power upon the outcome of the war so
important” that he would “scour the country” to find
enough public relations experts to reinforce press representatives in the theater. Because of his emphasis,
by November 1944, fully 40 percent of the total film
released by the U.S. Army to newsreels came from
AAF combat camera units.5
Even this increased cinematic output did not please
Arnold, who wanted more front-page stories in the
print media as well, and sent out to all commanders a list
of 50 points to writing proper news releases. Thinking
ahead about the future of the AAF, he was determined
that, “through proper presentation to the press,” the
American people could get the facts necessary to make
“a correct evaluation of the part air power has played
in this war” so that “the United States should not make
the mistake of allowing, through lack of knowledge,
the tearing down in postwar years of what has cost us
so much blood and sweat to build up.”6
Newsreels and still photos released by the AAF
never showed collateral damage and instead emphasized accuracy and discriminate targeting. There was
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a mutually reinforcing relationship between AAF pronouncements and public attitudes that still exists today.
AAF planners interpreted public opinion as favoring precision attacks on economic and military targets without unnecessary civilian casualties. Military
reports and news releases designed to demonstrate the
accuracy and effectiveness of supposed pinpoint bombardment in turn shaped public expectations.
AAF headquarters was always concerned about a
negative reaction from the public to attacks on enemy
cities, and their fears seemed realized in February 1945.
As the result of a press conference after the Dresden,
Germany, attacks on February 14 and 15, nationwide
headlines appeared such as “Terror Bombing Gets
Allied Approval as Step to Speed Victory.” Howard
Cowan, an Associated Press reporter, based his story
on a briefing in Paris, France, by Air Commodore C. M.
Grierson of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) air staff. Grierson did not mention causing terror or civilian casualties, but he did
point out that recent heavy bomber attacks on population centers such as Dresden had caused great need for
relief supplies and had strained the economic system.
Arnold was appalled at the negative publicity
and immediately demanded an explanation from
Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces
in Europe. Spaatz was in the Mediterranean, but his
deputy commander for operations, Major General
Frederick Anderson, replied that the report had exaggerated the briefing officer’s statements and had never
been cleared by censors. He reiterated that their mission remained to destroy Germany’s ability to wage
war, and that the AAF did not consider attacks on
transportation centers terror attacks. “There has been
no change in policy, . . . there has been only a change
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of emphasis in locale.” Anderson also wrote to Major
General Laurence Kuter on Arnold’s staff and told him
that, because an RAF officer had caused the trouble,
it had “led some people to say that it was intentional
in an effort to tar us with the same brush with which
British Bomber Command has been tarred.” RAF night
area raids on German cities were much more controversial. Anderson disagreed: “I believe it was a shear
[sic] case of absolute stupidity by an incompetent officer.” Theater commander General Dwight Eisenhower
confirmed that the briefer had gone beyond his knowledge and authority.7
Despite AAF fears of negative U.S. public reaction
to the announcements of terror bombing, none came.
Arnold was satisfied by February 20 that “the whole
matter is now definitely in hand,” but on March 5,
Secretary of War Henry Stimson asked for an investigation of Dresden: “An account of it has come out
of Germany which makes the destruction seem on its
face terrible and probably unnecessary.” He did not
want Dresden destroyed since he hoped the capital of
Saxony could be “a portion of the country which can
be used to be the center of a new Germany which will
be less Prussianized and be dedicated to freedom.”
Typically, Stimson found out about the incident long
after the fact and not through regular channels. He was
rarely kept informed of operational details by the joint
staff, and he most likely read the accounts of Grierson’s
briefing in the press.
Arnold, recuperating in Florida from a heart attack,
was very perturbed when informed that Stimson was
concerned about the raid. Reflecting his exasperation
with everyone who questioned AAF bombing policies,
Arnold scrawled on a message from his headquarters
dealing with Stimson’s request, “We must not get soft.
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War must be destructive and to a certain extent inhuman and ruthless.” But that is not an attitude he or
other AAF leaders expressed in public. The resulting
AAF report by Arnold’s staff was not so callous and
correctly blamed RAF incendiary bombs for most of
the damage in Dresden. Trustful of his military advisers, Stimson seemed satisfied, and he let the matter
drop. The whole controversy caused Arnold considerable strain and contributed to his declining health and
numerous convalescent leaves and trips.8
Partly as a result of this controversy and partly
because of an accidental bombing of Swiss territory
in February 1945, a new bombing policy was issued
to U.S. Strategic Air Forces on March 1. It emphasized
that only military objectives could be attacked and was
especially restrictive about attacks in occupied areas.
Attacks on built-up areas were considerably cut back,
though the Army continued to request attacks that the
airmen considered excessive. Spaatz maintained that
a town would be bombed only “when the Army specifically requires the action to secure its advance and
specifically requests each town as an individual target
in writing.” Major General David Schlatter, deputy
chief of air staff for SHAEF under Eisenhower, noted
that Spaatz’s policy was so restrictive because “he is
determined that the American air forces will not end
this war with a reputation for indiscriminate bombing.”9 Along with other AAF leaders, Spaatz realized
how important the service’s public image would be in
attaining coveted independence.
That reputation for indiscriminate targeting would
become harder to avoid in light of Major General Curtis
LeMay’s incendiary bombing campaign against Japanese cities, which began the same month as the new
restrictive bombing directive in Europe. Newspaper
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accounts of the fire raids, mirroring AAF intelligence
on bombing results, concentrated on physical damage
rather than on civilian deaths. Articles on the big Tokyo
raid on the night of March 9, 1945, that opened the
campaign were typical. They noted the heavy population density but emphasized that in the area destroyed,
“eight identifiable industrial targets lie in ruins along
with hundreds of other industrial plants.” One account
quoting LeMay mentioned thousands of “home industries” destroyed, and another claimed that the raid’s
purpose was realized “if the B-29s shortened the war
by 1 day.” Accounts did not estimate civilian casualties, but they did proclaim that the many thousands
made homeless posed an immense refugee problem
for the Japanese Government. Deaths were not mentioned, and there were no pictures of the destruction,
just maps of the destroyed zone.10 The lack of reference
to noncombatant casualties by the press resulted from
a similar oversight in AAF accounts of the incendiary
attacks. This omission was not an example of AAF censorship, since mission reports also neglected such statistics; such figures were difficult to determine even by
civil defense authorities on the ground and were not
normally included in AAF intelligence assessments
that relied primarily on aerial photography.
AAF headquarters in Washington, DC, reacted
ecstatically to the incendiary attacks, and planners
quickly developed a new list of industrial sectors
within cities for priority targets. The 20th Air Force
headquarters, the command element over Lemay’s
21st Bomber Command, was back in Washington
under Arnold’s direct control, and it assured LeMay
on Guam that, except for aircraft engine plants, there
were no real strategic bottlenecks in Japan suitable to
attack, but “Japanese industry as a whole is vulnerable
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to attacks on the principal urban industrial areas.”
LeMay received congratulatory letters from Arnold
and other AAF leaders in Washington.
Among key figures there, only Stimson seemed
troubled. He apparently learned the details of the raids
later and then from press accounts, probably after
LeMay gave a briefing on Guam about the fire raids on
May 30 that produced stories claiming it was possible
that “1,000,000, or maybe even twice that number of
the Emperor’s subjects” had perished in the conflagrations. On June 1, Stimson told Arnold that Assistant
Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett had promised
that only precision bombing would be used against
Japan, not the first or last case of exorbitant promises
of accuracy and effectiveness from American air leaders. Arnold explained that, because of Japanese dispersal of their industry, “it was practically impossible to
destroy the war output of Japan without doing more
damage to civilians connected with the output than
in Europe.” Arnold did promise, “they were trying to
keep it down as far as possible.”
Having no other information, Stimson believed
Arnold. In a later meeting with President Harry
Truman, the Secretary of War repeated Arnold’s arguments. Stimson was anxious because he did not want
his country to “get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in
atrocities.” Paradoxically, he also was afraid that the
AAF would leave Japan “so thoroughly bombed out”
that no suitable target would remain to demonstrate
the atomic bomb. Stimson continued to approve the
fire raids, but was very disappointed that there was
no public protest about them.11 In a trend that continues today, the American public and political leaders always seemed to assume that airmen were doing
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the best they could to win the war with the technology
they had in accordance with national values.
At the Potsdam Conference in Germany, Arnold
passed out books of photographs showing the destruction of Japanese cities, a common form of airpower
publicity. When Stalin proposed a toast to a meeting
in Tokyo, Arnold boasted, “If our B-29s continue their
present tempo there [will] be nothing left of Tokyo
in which to have a meeting.” His attitude was wellreceived by those assembled. Hatred for the Japanese
was evident, typified by Lord Louis Mountbatten’s
remarks that the Japanese royal family were “morons”
who should be liquidated. Arnold was optimistic
about his air forces’ ability to end the war, betting Sir
Charles Portal, the British chief of air staff, that the conflict would be over “nearer Christmas 1945 than Valentine’s Day 1946.”12
Arnold would win his bet handily. After the war,
the carefully crafted U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
(USSBS) furthered AAF arguments for independence
even more. To AAF leaders, the main lessons of that
analysis, prepared mostly by economists and scientists,
apparently were that better analysis of target systems
and an earlier focus on key industrial objectives such
as oil would have collapsed enemy economies much
sooner. In his detailed analysis of the conduct of the
USSBS, Gian Gentile concludes that the process was
carefully crafted to come up with results that would
support AAF doctrine and its possible decisiveness as
an independent service, both in the framing of questions for analysis and the selection of personnel to do
it. He asserts:
The civilian analysts of the USSBS accepted the American
conceptual approach to strategic bombing . . . made
it the analytical framework for their evaluation, and
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wrote conclusions about air power in World War II that
vindicated their conception.13

The seven-volume official history, The Army Air Forces
in World War II, appearing between 1948 and 1958, was
also written with that agenda in mind.14
LEGACIES FOR KOREA AND VIETNAM
The beginnings of the new National Military Establishment in 1947, which would eventually become the
Department of Defense, with an independent air service, occurred during a tumultuous period of USAF
reorganization and doctrinal disputes that would continue into the early 1950s. The new service came into
existence with a revised structure installed by the new
Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz. Combat forces in
the continental United States were organized into the
Strategic Air Command (SAC), the Tactical Air Command (TAC), and the Air Defense Command, while
air units overseas were controlled by theater air commands. Support commands in the continental United
States included Air Materiel Command, Air Proving Ground Command, Air Training Command, Air
Transport Command, and Air University. Congress
approved a goal of 70 air groups for the service, but
rapid demobilization and budget cuts kept the force
well below that level until the rearmament sparked
by the Korean war. On V-J Day, the AAF possessed
2,253,000 men, but by the end of May 1947, its total
strength was down to only 303,614. Spaatz’s successor,
General Hoyt Vandenberg, proved himself very adept
at garnering support from Congress and the public for
USAF programs despite the administration’s reluctance to spend money on defense.15

12

The new service, and the new National Military
Establishment, also needed new doctrine. Interservice disputes prompted by battles over scarce budget
dollars as well as genuine differences of opinion,
exacerbated by a lack of a coherent national military
strategy, made joint doctrine almost impossible to
develop. The Navy even questioned the whole raison
d’être of the USAF, portraying plans to drop atomic
bombs in an air offensive against an enemy homeland
as immoral and ineffective. The ensuing controversy
taxed the new USAF’s public relations capabilities.
During the debates about the USAF B-36 bomber connected with the “Revolt of the Admirals” in 1949, Rear
Admiral Ralph Ofstie told the House Armed Services
Committee:
We consider that strategic air warfare as practiced in the
past and as proposed for the future, is militarily unsound
and of limited effect, is morally wrong, and is decidedly
harmful to the stability of the postwar world.

His accusations inspired a spirited defense by Major
General Orville Anderson of the Air University, who
argued that the United States “was not only morally
justified but morally obligated to develop our maximum strength to provide for our security” from the
aggression of totalitarian nations that would have
“little to worry about in a war with us fought according to traditional patterns.” This was not the first time
Ofstie and Anderson had disagreed over airpower
issues. They had first clashed while assigned to the
USSBS, where they had been the most strident spokesmen for their respective service viewpoints. The Navy
conveniently forgot their arguments about the immorality and ineffectiveness of strategic bombing when it
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got its own nuclear striking forces, an irony that was
gleefully highlighted by USAF supporters.16
Unfortunately, the strategic communications campaign about airpower capabilities designed to achieve
and then support independent status created expectations that could not be met in the Korean war. One
of the problems that the Far East Air Forces (FEAF)
encountered in Korea was that too many ground commanders and political leaders expected “miracles” from
airpower. In an interview, General Jacob Smart, who
directed FEAF operations in 1952 and 1953, asserted,
“Few people other than experienced Air Force people
appreciate the limitations of airpower.” Air forces
“have only destructive power,” and while it may be
substantial, it might not always be the best means to
an end. Additionally in Korea, FEAF sometimes lacked
the resources or competence to carry out assigned missions or those requested by supported units. This was
especially applicable to aerial interdiction. However,
Smart also admitted:
We air force people don’t advertise our limitations to
demagogic politicians, and we certainly don’t advertise
our limitations when we’re talking to the members of the
press, who are looking for the opportunity to denigrate
the speaker or his service.17

Ironically, those are probably the two groups who
require the most education about the realistic capabilities of airpower.
After the armistice was signed in 1953, the USAF
looked back at its first war with a great sense of pride
and accomplishment. Despite limited resources and
many restrictions, the “shoestring” service believed it
had been “the decisive force in Korea” and primarily
responsible for most United Nations (UN) successes,
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an opinion not shared by historians. This attitude was
supported by many articles and historical studies in
USAF journals that came out soon after the war ended,
praising FEAF’s accomplishments. FEAF commander
General O. P. Weyland himself contributed a number
of capstone pieces summing up the record of his command, trying to capture lessons applicable to future
conflicts. His article in the first Air University Quarterly
Review after the armistice set the tone for future service
interpretations of the war that were widely trumpeted.
He defended the USAF approach to close air support,
which had often been denigrated in comparison to
U.S. Marine Corps bombing support in the press, and
claimed it destroyed over 150,000 enemy troops and
750 tanks in the first year alone. He admitted that the
interdiction campaign did not completely prevent the
Communist forces from conducting limited attacks or
an obstinate defense, but “it was an unqualified success in achieving its stated purpose, which was to deny
the enemy the capability to launch and sustain a general offensive.” It also was an important component
of the punishing air attacks that were the primary UN
offensive strategy during the last 2 years of the war
in an “air pressure” campaign that decimated North
Korean cities and towns, despite determined enemy
efforts to challenge UN air superiority. In his view,
these air attacks finally compelled the Communists to
accept the armistice. Weyland ended his essay with a
prescient plea for the development of new ways to use
airpower to achieve limited objectives in a new kind of
war.18
The USAF itself was also very sensitive to any
downplaying of its role in Korea, and executed a vigorous publicity campaign to defend it. In 1955, FEAF
Assistant Deputy for Operations Colonel James T.
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Stewart was reassigned to USAF headquarters in
Washington in a research and development planning
and programming capacity. While there, the USAF
Public Information Office (PIO) selected him to edit a
book that would demonstrate the service’s important
contributions in Korea. The title, Airpower: The Decisive
Force in Korea, conveyed the message the USAF wanted
to send. The PIO had already accumulated most of the
material, consisting primarily of articles from the Air
University Quarterly Review, and Colonel Stewart did
some editing and worked with the civilian publisher
who had agreed to print the finished product. His
volume, which began with Weyland’s article summing
up FEAF’s air campaign, contains detailed studies of
key bombing operations with some primary accounts
to bolster the theme that, “Without question, the decisive force in the Korean war was airpower.” At the
same time Stewart was pursuing that project, Robert
Futrell at the Air University was culling through his
three classified historical studies of the war to produce
his superb The United States Air Force in Korea 19501953. Futrell completed his work late in 1958 after
Stewart’s book had already been published. A detailed
narrative of the air war, Futrell’s book also emphasizes
the themes of successful and decisive airpower Weyland espoused, and attributes the new postwar defense
policies of President Eisenhower to the fact that “the
years of the Korean war marked acceptance of the predominance of airpower among America’s armed-force
capabilities.” Futrell maintained this position when he
revised the book in 1983 as well.19
The USAF also had to revise its communications
strategy to deal with problems in recruitment. In March
1952, the acting chief of the Aviation Medicine Division
of the Office of the USAF Surgeon General circulated
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among the air staff a study on “Fear of Flying and Lack
of Motivation to Learn to Fly.” He cited a number of
alarming trends that threatened the USAF’s ability to
maintain the necessary quality and quantity of flight
crews. Among the disturbing findings were statistics
that less than one-half-of-one percent of USAF Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps graduates had applied for
flight training and (even after lowering qualification
requirements) only 700 applications had been received
for 1,600 May pilot training quotas. He suggested that
the USAF needed “an enthusiastic, sustained, and
well-financed program to popularize flying throughout the entire country in order to re-establish a keenness
for flying among the youth of the nation.” Responses
to the study supported its conclusions. Some blamed
the lack of interest in flying on apprehension about
jet aircraft, and an unwillingness to experiment with
the new technology. Only by appealing to a younger
age group of 17 to 21-year-olds would “exceptions to
guinea pigs” be found. Other suggestions included
a television show to influence parental opinion, and
comic strips and movies to popularize the USAF. The
drop in youth interest in aviation coincided with what
historian Joseph Corn has portrayed as a period of
decline in “the air-age education movement” of the
late 1940s. The images of SAC nuclear bombers and
the grim realities of the Cold War chilled the enthusiasm for visions of global neighborliness and endless
possibilities for progress that the airplane had generated in American education for decades. The number
of aviation articles in educational journals and college
courses incorporating aeronautical themes declined
precipitously between the end of World War II and
the early 1950s. Eventually, Milton Caniff’s comic strip
“Steve Canyon” was designated to be subsidized to
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cover aviation cadet life and appeal to the 17 to 19 age
group. The comic did do much to promote a positive
image of the USAF, as did the television show that
derived from it.20
Soon another war in Asia would bring the same
sort of inflated expectations and disappointing results
for an air service still configured for a nuclear war with
the Soviet Union. The appointment of LeMay as Vice
Chief of Staff in 1957, and Chief of Staff 4 years later,
reinforced the USAF emphasis on strategic nuclear
bombing. By 1964, three-fourths of the highest-ranking officers on the air staff came from SAC. LeMay
had completed the organization’s transformation into
the world’s most powerful striking force, and had
even supported the making of two more movies to
extol its virtues, Bombers B-52 and Gathering of Eagles.
Ironically, however, the image of his legacy that has
been most lasting comes from another film, Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Bomb. No matter how hard they try, military services
cannot control which movie metaphors the public will
embrace. LeMay has often been mistakenly identified with the character of General Jack D. Ripper, the
insane commander who decides to launch his bombers to start World War III and counter the evils of fluoridation. LeMay decided early in his career that he
lacked the political skills to be diplomatic with superiors, and determined always to be blunt and straightforward with his opinions, “whether you liked it or
not.” He also appears to have enjoyed shocking people
at times with some of his more inflammatory statements. But he would not start a war on his own. Like
General Buck Turgidson in the movie, however, the
character that most resembles LeMay, he was going
to make sure that if general war did begin, the United
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States would achieve the best possible result. General
Ripper’s characterization was based more on Thomas
Power, LeMay’s successor as commander of SAC, who
remained in that capacity for 7 years. He was an even
more extreme advocate of SAC’s mission than his predecessor. Power achieved notoriety in 1958 when he
wrote a book on nuclear strategy called Design for Survival, but the Secretary of Defense would not approve
its publication by a uniformed officer. In the book,
Power decried disarmament and advocated a posture
of overwhelming military superiority for the United
States. He became a hero in conservative circles as the
author of the “banned book,” and was the only military witness to testify against the nuclear test ban
treaty before the Senate in 1963.21
None of the American armed services were really
ready for the situation they confronted in Vietnam,
but again, civilian leaders based their early wartime
decision-making on high expectations for airpower. As
Mark Clodfelter and Earl Tilford have chronicled, the
USAF had the wrong doctrine, equipment, and training to deal with limited war in Southeast Asia. Even
America’s expanded tactical airpower was configured
for nuclear attacks and not prepared for the new challenges. As Caroline Ziemke has so eloquently stated,
“Like Dorian Grey, TAC had sold its soul in exchange
for vitality; and in Vietnam, the world got a look at
its aged and decrepit conventional structure.” Perhaps
the USAF could have successfully executed its initial
proposal in 1964 for a classic strategic bombing campaign against 94 targets in North Vietnam that would
have destroyed “its capacity to continue as an industrially viable state,” but that contingency did not take
into account the nature of the insurgency in the South,
support from China and the Union of Soviet Socialist
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Republics, or the concerns of President Lyndon Johnson and his advisers about widening the war. While
military leaders modeled their recommendations on
the strategy that they believed had been successful in
World War II, their civilian bosses harkened back to
the actions that had incited Chinese intervention in
Korea. As the gradual escalation of Operation ROLLING THUNDER (or “Rolling Blunder” as airmen today
refer to it) continued, the USAF had to relearn how to
fight a joint limited war. The new campaign revealed
again the difficulties with aerial interdiction of primitive and manpower-intensive supply systems, and
that the USAF had still not developed effective night
capabilities. For Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton
Collins, Vietnam reaffirmed the lessons learned in
Korea: that “no amount of aerial bombing can prevent
completely the forward movement of supplies, particularly in regions where ample manpower is available.” The old interservice disputes about command
and control and close air support quickly resurfaced,
with additional friction over the role of helicopters.
Analysts of the early years of the air war in Vietnam
have noted, “not only were past mistakes repeated,
but new challenges resulted in new mistakes.” Command and control of tactical air operations was so bad
it “would have led to disaster if U.S. forces had faced
a capable air opponent.” Though the command of air
elements in Vietnam was even more fragmented than
in Korea, Operation ROLLING THUNDER was primarily the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific (CINCPAC). It is interesting to speculate how
the air campaign would have been conducted if it had
begun a year earlier, when General Jacob Smart was
commander of the Pacific Air Forces under CINCPAC.
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Perhaps his experience in Korea would have made a
difference in the way the air campaign was conducted.22
As in Korea, a resolute enemy with a simple economy thwarted superior technology in weapons. Operations such as ROLLING THUNDER drew directly
on the precision-bombing doctrine to target North
Vietnam’s vital economic and military centers and to
destroy its capacity to wage war. A combination of
political restrictions, gradualist tactics in the application of force, and the nature of the enemy’s will
and infrastructure frustrated these grandiose plans.
Because of an exaggerated opinion of American success with air interdiction in World War II and Korea,
the USAF concentrated heavy bombing on enemy
supply lines and sources in North and South Vietnam.
In 1967, General Matthew Ridgway wrote,
There were those who felt, at the time of the Korean War,
that air power might accomplish miracles of interdiction.
. . . The fact that it could not accomplish these miracles has
not yet been accepted as widely as it should have been.23

He believed that “some in high position” still failed to
appreciate the limitations of airpower. These deficiencies were evident in ineffective campaigns against precision target systems such as oil and electric power. As
then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara came to
realize that the agrarian economy and guerrilla forces
of the North Vietnamese would never collapse from
bombing, USAF leaders chafed to be free of political
restrictions so that they could strike harder at key targets in Hanoi and Haiphong.24
The newly-elected President, Richard Nixon, gave
the USAF its chance with Operations LINEBACKER
I and LINEBACKER II, which included sending strategic bombers against objectives in North Vietnamese
cities. Earlier attempts to destroy small factories with
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B-52 bombers had just highlighted their “inability . . .
to hit a small target without damage to the surrounding civilian population,” a result that brought a halt to
such missions.25 Nixon allowed even more extensive
targeting of urban storage and transportation facilities.
Accuracy was relatively good and evacuations helped
keep casualties low. Though 730 B-52 sorties attacking urban targets during Operation LINEBACKER II
in December 1972 caused only 1,318 civilian deaths,
considerable public outcry arose against the operation,
and world opinion quickly compared the attacks with
World War II area bombing raids, such as those against
Dresden. When advised to inflate their claims of civilian casualties, the North Vietnamese refused, claiming
correctly that such a relatively low number would still
be enough to incite uproar both internationally and
domestically. The higher the expectations for accuracy, the easier it is to exploit the inevitable frictions
of aerial bombardment, and the period of the Vietnam war marked the nadir of American public trust
and support for its military in the last century, meaning that people were more willing to question military
claims. The operations did fulfill the Commander in
Chief’s goal to bring the North Vietnamese back to the
peace talks, however, and helped persuade them to
accept a ceasefire in January 1973. Nixon also intended
Operation LINEBACKER II to impress the South Vietnamese and to gain their support for the results of the
negotiations.26
Five months of Operation LINEBACKER I had
crippled North Vietnam’s military capability, and
the 11 days of Operation LINEBACKER II had unsettled its urban populace. Despite harsh criticisms in
the American press and public protests, Nixon had
continued attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong until
the North Vietnamese agreed to return to the peace
22

table. The aerial operations against cities that had to
be defended had depleted North Vietnam’s supply
of surface-to-air missiles as well as military and civilian food stocks; thus, leaders decided to negotiate to
gain a respite from further bombings. Again the USAF
reacted quickly to control the postwar narrative about
its effectiveness in the conflict and for future operations, though there was no systematic evaluation like
the USSBS, or speedily produced official histories as
there was for Korea. USAF proponents instead used
the results of Operation LINEBACKER II to claim that
political constraints had prevented them from winning
the war, and retired Generals LeMay and William M.
Momyer echoed that sentiment by asserting that unrestrained airpower could win any war. Yet, as historian
Mark Clodfelter has pointed out, “Most air commanders fail to understand that the ‘Eleven-Day War’ was
a unique campaign for very limited ends.” It did not
cause the North Vietnamese Army or nation to surrender; it simply furthered Nixon’s political goal for
a negotiated settlement and delayed final victory for
his enemies; Operations LINEBACKER did not vindicate American tactics or target selection. In fact, there
is an installation in Hanoi called “The Museum of Victory over the B-52” that asserts that the December 1972
downing of 15 B-52s in a “Dien Bien Phu of the air” led
to American withdrawal.27 But another limited conflict involving an air campaign against a state, this time
in Southwest Asia, would produce more USAF arguments for the decisiveness of airpower.
INFLATED EXPECTATIONS FROM OPERATION
DESERT STORM AND THE BALKANS
Operation DESERT STORM seemed to feature the
perfect air war, the culmination of the American search
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for precise targeting and weaponry. While newspaper cartoons portrayed cruise missiles reading street
signs, General Norman Schwarzkopf’s daily briefings highlighted the accuracy of bombing on buildings and bridges. Almost every day, the world was
treated to another video display of amazing precision.
From the beginning, limited war aims and concerns
about maintaining the fragile Allied coalition influenced the execution of the air offensive. This does not
mean that extensive bombing of targets in Iraqi cities
did not occur. American air strikes destroyed water,
power, and transportation facilities in Baghdad. Strategic targets pinpointing electricity, oil, communications, supply depots, and transportation nodes were
hit throughout Iraq. From the beginning of the war,
administration officials and military leaders emphasized that commanders in the field would be allowed
to fight the war free of interference from Washington,
and there were few prescribed limitations on the targeting of military and economic objectives. In one notable exception, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review all missions
over Baghdad after the bombing of the Amiriya bunker
that killed many civilians.28 Otherwise, the USAF exercised great restraint regarding sacred sites and residential areas, though some collateral damage resulted
from near misses or downed cruise missiles. Learning
their lessons from Vietnam, leaders in Southwest Asia
and Washington responded quickly to counter any
claims of indiscriminate bombings with explanations
and photographs.
However, the images from the press conferences
were misleading, though they would have long-lasting
influence on public perceptions of precision targeting.
Iraq absorbed half as many so-called “smart bombs”
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in 43 days as Vietnam did in 8 years, but precision
munitions made up only 6,250 of 88,500 tons of bombs
dropped on Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Although 90
percent of the smart weapons hit their targets, the
accuracy rate for unguided bombs was only 25 percent. Over 62,000 tons of bombs missed their targets, a
rather disappointing level of precision. The USAF did
conduct a thorough evaluation of the air campaign in
the Gulf War Air Power Study (GWAPS) headed by
Eliot Cohen. Realizing the shortcomings of the USSBS,
the GWAPS team strove for objectivity, so much so that
the USAF leadership was greatly disappointed that the
findings were not more triumphal, and restricted its
distribution.29
There was some criticism in the international press.
Yasuo Kurata, a political commentator for the newspaper, Tokyo Shimbun, was highly critical of Americans
and the USAF after the bombing of the air-raid shelter
in Amiriya that “slaughtered more than 400 people,
including about 100 infants and young children.”
Discounting official insistence that the underground
bunker was a communications center, Kurata claimed
that Americans are insensitive to civilian casualties
because they have never been bombed themselves.
He invoked images of Dresden and Tokyo, describing
his own memories of the latter raid in graphic detail,
and accused the U.S. military of a tendency to dismiss
the loss of life as “collateral damage,” an “inevitable
byproduct of aerial warfare. . . . Carpet bombing by
B-52s is the U.S. Air Force’s stock in trade. The huge
aircraft can destroy entire cities from 30,000 feet; the
collateral damage can well be imagined.” He implied
that Asians and Europeans, sensitized by their own
experiences of being bombed, were opposed to the air
war against Iraqi cities but that Americans remained
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ignorant of the costs of such aerial bombardment and
did not seem to care.30
It is easy to criticize Kurata’s position. Americans
did not ignore the tragedy in Amiriya; it received
extensive media coverage, and command authorities
from the president on down took action to ensure that
such incidents did not recur. The experience of being
bombed did not stop British or German raids during
World War II, nor did it affect European support for
the effort to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait. B-52s have
never carpet-bombed cities, though Kurata seems to
imply that Americans are uniquely preoccupied with
urban area attacks. Obviously, this is a distortion of
history; he could have been reminded that Japanese
aircraft conducted the first air war against population
centers when they bombed China in the 1930s. Yet,
one should not completely discount Kurata’s perceptions. Fears of massive retaliatory American air raids
on Baghdad helped deter Saddam Hussein from using
chemical or biological weapons in the Gulf war. There
is a unique deterrent effect from the threat of massed
air attacks that is on display in museums in Beijing
and Hanoi. One of the reasons for the relatively easy
American advance on Baghdad in 2003 was that so
many Iraqi soldiers had surrendered or deserted,
many persuaded by one of more than 40 million airdropped psychological warfare leaflets that communicated if the soldiers went home, they would avoid the
destruction of mass air strikes, as was the case from a
decade before.31 One of the challenges of the current
emphasis on long-range precision strikes is that such
attacks do not have the same fearsome deterrent value
as a mass B-52 raid. Creating expectations of decisive
results with a few accurately placed bombs that do not
cause collateral damage makes the application of more
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powerful, large-scale air attacks more difficult for the
public and politicians to consider and accept.
The apparent rapid and decisive success of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 launched a deluge of
claims that warfare had changed. Debates raged about
whether the new technologies displayed portended
a full-blown revolution in military affairs. Airpower
advocates trumpeted the results of the air campaign
against Iraq and later operations in the Balkans to
advocate the expansion of USAF missions.32 The Battle
of Khafji, where aircraft stopped an Iraqi foray from
Kuwait into Saudi Arabia, became the model for a
publicity campaign for a “halt phase” construct where
air units alone could hold off a major enemy theater
offensive long enough to allow the build-up of American ground forces. Even ground forces succumbed
to this technological euphoria. The 1993 Army Operations Manual, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, was
based on the premise that the United States would
always be able to use “overwhelming force as a way to
achieve decisive victory with minimum cost to friendly
forces,” and to exploit “near-perfect, near-real-time
intelligence systems.”33 Air supremacy was another
key assumption of the new warfighting doctrine. The
bombing campaign to get the Serbs out of Kosovo in
1999 inspired historian John Keegan to declare that
conflict to be the first ever successfully won by the air
arm alone, and that perceived success helped reinforce
the concept of “shock and awe” that gained many
adherents before war was again launched on Iraq in
2003.34
Air operations in the disintegrating Yugoslavia
seemed to support these new expectations for airpower.
Seventeen days of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) air strikes during Operation DELIBERATE
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FORCE in September 1995 helped persuade the Serbs
to accept a ceasefire in Bosnia, and eventually to
sign the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Dayton, Ohio, in November. Though ground threats
from Bosnian Muslims and Croats and a rampaging
Croatian Army were more significant in achieving
that result, airpower advocates were again quick to
claim decisive, independent effects.35 So when another
Balkan crisis erupted and diplomacy failed to resolve
it, this time over Kosovo in 1999, American and NATO
political leaders were prepared to pin their hopes on
an air campaign alone to resolve the situation without
a ground invasion.
When the bombing campaign commenced, Pentagon planners admitted they did not expect it to force
President Slobodan Milosevic to sign a peace agreement. Instead, President Bill Clinton announced that
military operations had three primary goals: stop the
ethnic cleansing as the Serbs expelled Kosovar Albanians, prevent even worse Serb depredations against
civilians there, and “seriously damage” the Serb military’s capacity to conduct such atrocities. In fact, the
ensuing air campaign accomplished none of those
objectives, and even initially worsened the situation
as Serb forces responded to the high-technology aerial
assault with a low-technology ravaging of the region.
The military forces in Kosovo proved to be very adept
at using decoys, camouflage, and human shields, and
hiding in towns, and postwar surveys revealed very
little damage had been done to them. What significant
results the air campaign achieved had to be accomplished through a shift to punishing attacks on Serbia
to coerce Milosevic to change his policies.36
Having to work with a 19-member NATO coalition
ensured that “shock and awe” would not be applied.
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NATO commander General Wesley Clark and his joint
force air component commander Lieutenant General
Michael Short wanted to hit power supplies, communications facilities, and command bunkers in Belgrade on the first night of Operation ALLIED FORCE,
but NATO political leaders would not even approve
strikes on occupied barracks, fearing too many dead
conscripts. Targeting was micromanaged even more
than in Vietnam. Eventually, Clark got approval to
attack a wider target array but still had to get clearance to hit each objective from any nation participating with aircraft on the mission. New information
systems facilitated an amazingly complex target selection and review system, linking operational planners
in Germany, Belgium, and the United States with data
analysts in England and weapons experts in Italy.
Lawyers in Germany assessed each target in terms of
the Geneva Convention, confirming its military nature
and evaluating whether its value outweighed any risks
of collateral damage. Clark held daily teleconferences
with NATO leaders and finished the process by passing target lists to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White
House for a final blessing.37
With high expectations for accuracy and much
political squeamishness among European allies, inevitable but unanticipated errors such as the bombing
of the Chinese Embassy and a Yugoslav train eroded
support for the air war, and put considerable pressure
on NATO political and military leaders to achieve
results. Even meticulous planning and precision munitions could not overcome erroneous maps or prevent
that train from running late and right onto the targeted
bridge as the bomb arrived. Clark was close to running
out of militarily useful and politically acceptable targets
when he secured approval for the most important raid
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of the campaign on May 24, 1999. The destruction of the
transformer yards of the Yugoslav power grid disabled
everything from the air defense command-and-control
network to the country’s banking system. It demonstrated NATO’s strength and dominance to the political leaders and the civilian population. Knocking out
the electric power system also took away power from
hospitals and water-pumping stations. Military lawyers made the moral implications clear to Clark. One
recalled, “We’d have preferred not to have to take on
these targets. But this was the Commander’s call.” All
major Serb cities experienced extended power disruptions until a settlement was reached on June 10 after a
78-day (and night) campaign.38
Despite European attempts to restrain attacks, a
less-than-final settlement was achieved by the same
sort of “imposed cost” strategy applied in Korea and
Vietnam, resulting in massive destruction of the civilian infrastructure of Yugoslavia. Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon sounded like Giulio Douhet, an early
airpower theorist who advocated achieving victory
through massive attacks on enemy cities to break
civilian morale, by speculating that the main factor
in Milosevic’s acceptance of terms “was the increasing inconveniences that the bombing campaign was
causing in Belgrade and other cities.” As in all strategic air campaigns against states, the list of acceptable
bombing objectives expanded as the conflict continued. A broad definition of the term “dual-use” opened
up a wide array of targets, including bridges, heating plants, and television stations, for NATO airmen.
Black humor in Belgrade determined that even bakeries were valid targets because “soldiers also eat
bread.” Serb propaganda videos of the damage and
casualties wreaked by NATO airpower in attacks on
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cities, factories, and power plants gained some international sympathy, but the same images that fanned
anti-NATO and anti-American sentiments also reinforced a sense of futility in the besieged civilian population, since the Serb military’s air defenses seemed
powerless to do anything to stop the mounting devastation. When the conflict ended, 45 percent of Yugoslavia’s TV broadcast capability was degraded; a third of
military and civilian radio relay networks were damaged; petroleum refining facilities were completely
eliminated; and 70 percent of road and 50 percent of
rail bridges across the Danube River were down. The
whole regional economy was degraded for many years
afterward.39
It is still unclear exactly why Milosevic gave in to
NATO demands. He did get a better deal than the Rambouillet Accords offered in March 1999. We will probably never know exactly what the Russians advised him.
Despite their vocal opposition to the bombing campaign, Russia did assist NATO by not upgrading outdated Yugoslav air defense systems. Open discussions
about the possibility of a NATO ground invasion and
an apparent growing willingness to gather peacekeeping forces in the region probably had some influence
on Yugoslav leaders. But in the end, the air campaign
did achieve the adjusted political goals. Postwar analysts highlighted growing fears among Serb leaders
that the aerial assault would eventually escalate to the
level of World War II city bombing, and the fact that
the air attacks increasingly threatened the holdings of
Milosevic’s most important political supporters. However, there was no systematic, official evaluation conducted such like USSBS or GWAPS. In October 1999,
Secretary of Defense William Cohen did present the
findings of a Kosovo after action review conducted by
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his office, but it does not represent a conclusive analysis of the impact of airpower. In fact, the written report
submitted to Congress in January 2000 was so devoid
of hard facts that Pentagon officials jokingly labeled it
“fiber-free.”40
Despite NATO’s careful targeting, there was still
much criticism of the campaign in the press. It does
appear that the growing intensity of attacks on dualuse targets in Belgrade and other cities was significant
in achieving NATO’s political goals. Accordingly,
there is a good probability that Yugoslav civilian casualties exceeded their military ones. For instance, soon
after the conflict ended, Michael Dobbs estimated that
the Serbs suffered 1,600 civilian casualties and only
1,000 military ones. Human Rights Watch completed a
study later that lowered estimates of Yugoslav civilian
dead to 500 from 90 separate attacks, but was still very
critical of NATO targeting practices and concluded
that half the casualties could have been avoided. This
is particularly ironic considering the expectations for
a bloodless war caricatured so well in Doonesbury
cartoons and reinforced by NATO briefings on targeting accuracy.41 These high NATO expectations for
extremely low casualties on both sides helped convince the more reluctant coalition members to support
the air campaign, and magnified the negative impact
on alliance cohesion of each scene of civilian dead and
wounded. Yet those same images also increased Serb
fears and weakened their resolve. Ironically, such incidents appeared to have reduced the will to continue the
conflict on both sides. Media images and accusations
motivated UN war crimes prosecutors of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
to begin assessing evidence in December that NATO
commanders had violated the laws of war with their
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air attacks, an example of “lawfare” to limit the application of airpower. (They decided not to pursue formal
charges.) Other war crimes charges coming from
Amnesty International and the British Parliament’s top
foreign affairs panel criticized the bombing as being of
“dubious legality.” Michael Ignatieff has aptly pointed
out that journalists’ accounts of the maneuvering of
cruise missiles in Iraq and fascination with precision
munitions have reinforced a myth in Western publics
that war can now be thought of as laser surgery. In the
dogged pursuit of the ideal of “precision bombing,”
the USAF has improved its capabilities tremendously,
but the term “surgical air strike” remains an oxymoron. Some targeting errors and technical failures will
always occur, and blast effects are often unpredictable. The errant raid on the Chinese Embassy looks
even more sinister when air forces claim operational
perfection.42
When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took
office under the new administration of George W.
Bush in 2001, he planned to cut ground forces and
exploit the new capabilities of airpower. His course of
action seemed vindicated that year by the campaign in
Afghanistan, where U.S. Special Forces calling in air
strikes enabled the Northern Alliance to quickly overthrow the Taliban. Analysts who looked closely at what
happened in Afghanistan soon concluded that while
airpower had definitely tipped the balance there, the
presence of capable, indigenous allies with the proper
skills and commitment to provide the necessary and
unique ground force contribution was also essential
for success. The tens of thousands of experienced fighters in the Northern Alliance were also an important
part of the equation that would not usually be present in other potential theaters of operation, like Iraq.
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The most astute of those studies cautioned, “Among
the most serious potential errors stemming from a misreading of the Afghan campaign would be to underestimate the costs of future American military action,” a
variation on Ignatieff’s concern about perceiving war
as cheap and bloodless.43 Indeed, Rumsfeld was so
enamored with his vision of this new model for warfare that he sent military reform advocate Douglas
Macgregor to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
headquarters in early 2002 to argue that all that would
be needed to conquer Iraq would be a 15,000-soldier,
armor-heavy ground force with plentiful air support,
with an additional 15,000 infantry added later to stabilize the country. Though Macgregor was rebuffed,
Rumsfeld continued to pressure CENTCOM to reduce
the size of the invading and follow-on forces. His success at cutting the number of soldiers in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM based on these false assumptions
about the future of warfare would have dire consequences later.44
As in Afghanistan, initial military operations in Iraq
also seemed easy and effective, as dominant airpower
decimated Saddam’s conventional military. Collateral
damage seemed minimized, and operational impact
maximized, a seeming example of Ignatieff’s “virtual
war.” However, the limitations of airpower became
more apparent as insurgencies erupted in both countries. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the American preference for long-range precision strike is that whoever
controls the ground controls the message. This is a
particular difficulty with drone strikes. Prompt bomb
damage assessment has never been a USAF strength,
and enemies are very quick to spin images and reports
of destroyed mosques and dead children, imagined
or real. By the time such impressions are refuted or
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a counternarrative presented, too many news cycles
have passed and first impressions have become lasting ones. In wars among the people, perceptions are
often more important than reality. Flaws in bomb
damage assessment procedures causing delays within
CENTCOM had been identified as far back as Operation DESERT STORM, but they remained to plague
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The USAF was
also reluctant to embrace emerging U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine emphasizing information
operations from the new FM 3-24 in 2006, claiming it
was too “ground centric,” instead pursuing their own
doctrine while continuing to assert such wars could be
won from 20,000 feet. In fact, service judge advocate
Major General Charles Dunlap mounted a very active
publicity campaign to protect service interests and discredit FM 3-24, an action Billy Mitchell would have
been proud of.45
Airpower is still a very useful tool in such conflicts.
Much of the success of the 2007 “surge” in Iraq was
due to carefully planned air strikes. The main problem
in both Afghanistan and Iraq has been with “on-call”
missions without such detailed planning, where pressure for quick action is high and the amount of reliable
intelligence is low. U.S. special operations forces have
also been especially criticized for poor communication
and coordination on air strikes. According to a detailed
study of Afghanistan by Human Rights Watch, it was
very clear that insurgent forces were killing more
civilians than U.S. and NATO forces, but expectations
were much higher for the counterinsurgents, and the
Afghan Government reacted to reports of civilian casualties by demanding new restrictive rules of engagement and even a strict status of forces agreement. Such
strike reports were gleefully exploited by the Taliban,
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as the information undermined public confidence in
the Afghan Government and its international allies.
Already at odds with many of those allies over his performance, President Hamid Kharzai also used civilian
casualties as a bludgeon against them.46
The poster child for the negative impact of erroneous expectations for airpower might be Libya. Former
President Barack Obama admitted that his resort to
airpower alone (along with European partners) in
2011 to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi without a corresponding ground force for control and rebuilding
was the “worst mistake” of his administration. The
end result was to turn that country into “Somalia on
the Mediterranean.” The backlash of that debacle had
repercussions in Syria, where Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey repeatedly
warned about the risks of just air strikes there, though
in the end, the Obama administration again adopted
an approach based primarily upon the application
of airpower. The jury is still out about how effective
it will be.47
There are many ironies in the American experience
with strategic communications and airpower. The pursuit of precision has produced truly impressive capabilites; but even more exorbitant expectations, often
fueled by service advocates seeking budget advantages or sincerely believing that the USAF had been
maligned or neglected, and rarely informed by an
objective evaluation of air campaigns. Success in selling those capabilities to decision-makers and actual
accomplishments utilizing them in operations have
further contributed to unrealistic expectations, with
political leaders especially attempting to do too much
with the wrong military tool. Americans have always
had great faith in technology, a fact that has assisted
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in the growth of the USAF while contributing to the
weight of expectations that it bears. The current state
of “counterinsurgency fatigue” in the United States
with no desire to employ ground troops will increase
burdens on airmen even more. It is not surprising that
many in the international arena seek normative ways
to limit the unique advantages airpower dominance
brings to the United States, creating another potential
obstacle.
Building on the legacy of Billy Mitchell and Hap
Arnold to create and publicize a unique set of warmaking capabilities, the USAF has become an
unmatched air service that inspires unrealistic expectations for what American airpower can do. The hardest task for strategic communications from future U.S.
military leaders will not be to explain all the great
things that their aircraft can accomplish, but instead to
honestly admit what they cannot.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Manage Expectations and Keep All Options Open
American military and civilian leaders must be
absolutely straightforward with all audiences about
the actual capabilities of airpower, and not just for limited strikes with precision munitions. As mentioned
earlier, one of our most effective deterrents is the threat
of massed air attacks, and that alternative must also be
explained and kept available. Exaggerating the potential of airpower might be good for garnering budget
dollars, but then its application is likely to lead to
disillusionment and reduced deterrence value. In the
worst case, inflated expectations of air attacks might
lure the nation into a conflict, which will just produce
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increased chaos on the ground, and will then require
more significant investments of blood and treasure to
remedy. Leaders must be careful to avoid premature
declarations of success, and must acknowledge that
the enemy gets a vote in the outcome of any military
operation.
Educate Leaders and the Public
The attraction of airpower to political leaders is
well-documented. They perceive it as a quick response
without a major commitment, yet still promising decisive results with minimal destruction on both sides
and essentially no risk of friendly casualties. Military
leaders must educate politicians and the public at
home and abroad that war is not a video game. Once
violence is launched, its course cannot be accurately
predicted. Intelligence is never perfect, blast effects
often produce unexpected results, and the major
drawback of so-called effects-based operations is that
they always produce more unintended effects than
intended ones. Though General Jacob Smart disdained
revealing the limitations of airpower to either politicians or the press, those are the most important groups
that really need to understand the realistic capabilities
of airpower.
Be First with the Truth
Airmen must put as much effort into the timely
assessment of the results of air operations as they do
in planning them. A painstaking examination of an
errant air strike that produces a long report a month
after the event might be acceptable to the more tolerant
American public, but for international and indigenous
audiences, too many news cycles will have passed to
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have any impact, and the negative narrative for the
event will already have become locked in the public
record. Such explanations must be produced in hours,
not days or weeks. One of the true masters of information warfare in contemporary conflicts is General
David Petraeus. Though he is identified most closely
with the conduct of COIN, much of what has been
classified in that category is really just modern warfare
among the people. There is much in the COIN doctrine
he helped develop and the way he applied it in Iraq
that is relevant to the contemporary application of airpower. This third recommendation comes right out of
his “Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance.” He stated:
Get accurate information of significant activities to your
chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon
as possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals
to the headlines, and pre-empt rumors. Integrity is critical
to this fight. Don’t put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge
setbacks and failures, and then state what we’ve learned
and how we’ll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves)
accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context.
Avoid spin and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge
enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies’ bankrupt
messages, extremist ideologies, and oppressive violence
against them.48

Fight the Information War Relentlessly
This is another tenet that is important to General
Petraeus. American political and military leaders must
actively engage continuously to counter lawfare initiatives to limit the application of airpower, no matter
how well-intentioned. Coalition nations working with
the United States must also be proactive with their own
information campaigns, and not just counterpunch.
Enemies must be put on the defensive. Coordinating
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this effort for all the audiences concerned will require
the participation and coordination of more than just
airmen. Some sort of special information agency might
be required at the theater or national levels. As General
Petraeus stated for Iraq:
Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that in
the end will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi
people. Every action taken by the enemy and United
States has implications in the public arena. Develop and
sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the
themes home through all forms of media.49

Invest More in Foreign Internal Defense
One of the easiest ways for the United States and
its allies to avoid criticism about air strikes from supported governments and their people is to make sure
such operations are conducted by their own indigenous
air force. That will probably require building one. Such
an organization not only provides supported nations
with their own unique asymmetric military advantage, it also becomes a source of national pride. Such
advisory support and assistance normally falls under
the category of foreign internal defense. Most Western
nations are usually very familiar with foreign internal
defense for ground forces, but the requirements for an
air force are different. For instance, while new ground
units are best brought into combat situations very gradually, air units need to be thrown right into operations.
Not only do they learn best that way, they also furnish
a major boost for indigenous morale with their display
of technological expertise.50 Such forces usually do not
require the most advanced aircraft. For instance, turboprop attack planes will often suffice for combat air
support requirements in austere theaters, and they are
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much cheaper and easier to maintain than jets. However, most supported nations usually want the same
aircraft as the United States. It would be advantageous
to maintain one squadron of such planes in the USAF
just as an example for other nations.
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